Andy Dale on the Second Corollary

Andy Dale sent me this comment about the Second Corollary:

Drummond, you say:

“[Concrete identifiers such as an email address] reveal a direct method of interacting with me (as would a phone number, fax number, IM address, postal address, etc.)”

This is an argument you also made in the First Corollary. I want to point out that my i-name [XRI] is also a direct method of interacting with me. BUT, I maintain control of the channels of communication so I don’t have to be protective of it.

I give out my home address (fairly) freely because I trust the security (my dog) to help me manage and maintain control of ingress and egress, much as I trust my authentication service and related communications service providers.

Andy is correct — I keep referring as XRIs as abstract identifiers that do not reveal a direct method of interaction with the resource they represent, particularly when the resource is a person who wishes to keep those methods of interaction private. Andy’s point is that XRI resolution CAN provide such a direct interaction method (such as i-name contact pages), but that due to the additional level of indirection, the XRI authority can control the use of this method of interaction.

Net net: XRIs for people can provide the best of both worlds – direct interaction and privacy protection.


About Drummond Reed

Internet entrepreneur in identity, personal data, and trust frameworks
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